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Abstract 
11 order to plan the efficient ulilization of coastal zones considering preservation 
o[ the environment， an acti，叫巴salocation model in consideration of j'heir interact.ive 
effects is proposed in ulis paper. Here， agglomeration economies are consicler巴das a 
pos1tive interactive efect， and external cliseconomies are treated as a negati.ve efect. 
This model is formulated by the n-person non-cooperative games and solvecl by com-
puter simulation. First， the concerned area should be dividecl into smal grids， and 
a potential analysis should l:e concluctecl. Then， the proposed model is appliecl to 
frame an acti.vities alloc;ation plan. As a ease study， this model is applied to actual 
coastal waters and Ils usefulness isexaminecl 
1. Introduction 
l 
Sinc巴 ]apanhas 1川 leflatland suIlable fo1' 1'esi白山aland product.ivf: ac-
tivities， coastal zones have been utilized fo1' those activities. Rec巴ntly，the demand 
fo1' coastal wate1's as well as lands has rapidly incr巴asecl目日ow巴ver，SJl1C巴 there
is no 1'ational methoclology of t.he co宇stalzon巴 useplanning，βn appropriate plan-
ning of those zones has not been cleveloped. As a result， random clev巴lopment
of coastal zones yielcls to an envir・CnlTI巴ntaldis1'uption and sprawling of the zones. 
Uilde1' th巴seci1'cumstances， a methocloJogy fo1' 1'ational coastal zone use planning 
is st1'ongly r巴quirecl. For the rational planning of coastal zon巴 u"巴，the e任ective
utilization of limitecl space ancl the decrease of the negative inte1'actions among 
activities should be considered. In ord巴rto establish this methodology， it is 
necessary to dev巴10pan activities alocation model which considers th巴 inter-
activ.己巴ffectsexplicitly 
Activities allocatiol1 moclels which have b巴end巴velopeclin p1'巴viouscoastal 
* Professor， Department of TransportatiOn Enginecl・ing，Kyoto UniverSlty， Sakyo・ku，Kyoto， 
.Japan 
ホ*Research Associate， Department of Transport:ation .Enginecrin日， Kyoto Univcl'sity， Sakyo-ku， 
Kyoto， J ~ .pall 
2 Yoshimi NAGAO and Takayuki MORIKAWA 
2'one use studie~ can be classified into twc groups: mathematical programming 
models and simulation models. 
Mathematical programming modeJs can make persuasive plans becaus巴
of their clear logic. However， there is a limit to express the complicat巴dprob・
lems on account of the restlIction of the solutions. Thexe are a few studies using 
mathematical programming models. For instance， there are the study of The 
4th District Port Construction Bureau of Ministry of Transport，l) which formu-
lates the problem by linear programming， and the study of Kashiwadani ancl 
Amano，2) which formulates it by multi-ohjective p1'og1'amming. 
On the other hancl， simulation models can accept the complicated problems 
easily. Howeve1'， they have the defect that it is difficult to make a 1'ational p1'o-
cess. Amano and Kashiwadanj3) and The 5th District Port Construction Bureau 
of Minist1'Y of Transport4) propose the simulation models in their studi巴S
This research aims to build an activities alloca tion moclel which consiclers 
the interactiv巴 effectsamong activities explicitly， and to propose a method o[ 
coastal zone planning. Thi~ model is a simulation model. Here， the interactive 
eftects mean the following two concepts. First， the positive inte1'active e汀ect
is agglome1'ation economies which occurs when simiJa1' activities are gathering. 
Next， the negative one isexternal dis嗣economiesmainly caused by environmental 
pollution. 1t occurs when incompatible activities are gathering. 
1n Chap. 2， the background， the basic conception and some p1'emises of 
this model are described. 1n Chap. 3， th(' umulation process of this model is 
巴xplained. Chap. 4 isa case study and Chap. 5 has concluding remarks. 
2. Basic Conception and Premises for Modelling 
2-1 Basic Conception for Mod巴lling
The activities alocation model proposed in this pape1' is a simulation model 
formulated by the n-person non-cooperative games. This model is charG'cterized 
by treating th巴positiveand negative interactive eftects among activities explicitly. 
The reason for t1'巴atingth巴m is that coastal waters <1.1'巳 susceptibleto environ-
mental change on account of their geographical and ecological distinction. This 
model isformulat.ecl 011 the basis of the folJowing recognition of the use of coastal 
waters 
Each of th巴 activitiesdemanding spac巴 incoaslal waters wants to locate 
at an advantageous point to itself， namely， the point with high locational potential 
value of thc activity. Hovvever， since coastal waters arc of limited space， there 
should be competition among activities in locating. And if there arc interactive 
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巴ffectsamong activities， the locational potential of a point wi1 be changed ac-
cording to the location of the adjacent points. Thus， the condition that each 
activity competes with each cther for maximlzmg its locational potential value 
can be recognized as the state of n-person non-cooperative games. That is to 
say， ifthe locotional point is consider巴das a strategy， the potential value of that 
point can be regarded as the payoff of the strategy. Further， the condition that 
a poyoff is changed by the interaction of other activity's location can be con-
sidered the essence of the games. Namely， inthe games a payoff of a strategy 
varies occording to other players' strat巴gles.
On the other hand， the planner wilJ aim to utilize the coastal waters巴fi-
ciently and impartially among activit.es. The e伍ciencyand the impartiality 
ar巴expressedin this mod巴1as fo11ows. First， for efficiency each activity predicts 
other activities' strategies stochastically and chooses the strategy which brings 
the maximum expected payo汀 Next，for impartiality this game has a rule that 
when two or more activities want to locate at the same point， the activity which 
relatively has fewer points with high potential values can locate therc. 
11 this model， the process of the activities a11ocation is simulated by a com-
puter. This is because simulation moclels ar巴 easierthan mathematical pro-
gramming models to adopt the complicated conditiom mch as int巴ractiveefi巴cts.
Though this model isexplain巴din detail in Chap. 3， the outline of framing an 
allocation plan is as fo11ows. First， the concerned area is divided into smal 
squared grids. Next， a potential analysis is conducted for every grid in l'巴gard
to every activity. Potential analysis is the analysis of the attractiveness for each 
activity， which cach place has as its inherent characteristics. Finally， th巴 pro-
posed activities allocation model isapplied to the concerncd area， and an alloca-
tion plan is framed. 
2-2 Premises and Assumptions for Modelling 
(1) The concerned area is coastal waters where no plan of utilization is fixed. 
(2) The concerned area can be divided into squared unit grids wher時巴 natural 
and social conditions can be regarded as uniform. Thus， the potentiol value 
is evaluated for each of these unit grids. 
(3) Mixed use of a unit gricl is prohibited， thal is， a grid is usecl fo1' 0111y onc 
actlvlty. 
(4) The area dema吋巴dby巴achactivity is apriori given by an appropriat巴
forecas ting. 
(5) The potential values of each grid for concerned activities are scorecl by pro-
fessional evaluations. This score is calculated by the linear combination of th巴
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Tabl巴 1 Evaluation T1'ee 101' Potenlial Analysis (Inclust.1'ial Type AClivity) 
l 2 3 4 
w叫 attributewe叫 at山 t weightl attl'ib山 we制 att1'ibute category ancl its utility 
over 20 m 20~ 1 0 111
0.65 c1epth 0.0 5.0 below 10 m 
10.0 
geaotluoeg2 lcal stone， rock 01' coral 
natural 0.15 10.0 construc- 0.6 1.0 、へlaters of the sea sand mud 
0.45 tional conditions 日001' 5.0 0.0 
conditions 
aoOpf~wp5ea0avr%e ahn5ec0e ig~phzt 7o0b% ealobw ilitly m 
0.2 wave height 0.0 3.3 
70~90% 90~ 100% 
6.7 10.0 
0，4 日ocial 1.0 roef gtut lation 1.0 harbour eXlst not cxist conditions he law area 10.0 0.0 
0~5 km 5~15 km 
c1istancc 10.0 7.5 
0，35 to the 15~30 km 30~50 km 
hImorpborutar nt 5.0 2.5 
over 50 km 
0.0 
distance 0~2 km 2~5 km 
0.25 to the 10.0 6，7 mtel・ 1 5~30 km over 15 km 
0.55 utilization 1.0 hinterland 1.0 traffic change 3.3 0.0 conditions conditions conditions P.XJst not eXJst 0.2 railway 10.0 。
o km 1 km 2 km 3 km 
10.0 9.0 8.0 7.0 
distance 4 km 5 km 6 km 7 km 
0.2 to the 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 national 8 km 9 km over 10 km 
road 2.0 1.0 0，  
the fi rst class 0.6 
the second class 0.4 
nvers the first class river exists 
natural beach area 
conditions tideland eXlst 
eXclusive walers tide ovcr 1.1 knotsfhoUl 
conditions 
the present algae area eXlst 
social state and bathing eXlst conditions loef gtuhll ation beach 
e law fishery 
port area eXIst 
(quoted from bibliography5)) 
weighted attributes' scores， as illustrated in Table 1. 
(6) Whcn an activity is allocated at a certain grid， its interactive effects influence 
the surrounding eight grids. 
(7) The interactive effects are express巴dhy the change of the potential values. 
Thc changes of thc p01CI11ial vaJucs can bc also estImated based on thc profes-
AI7 Alucation !Hodel司，[Int町田tii'eActivites /01" Coastal Zone Plml1ing 5 
sionals' judgem巴叫
3. The Formulation of the Allocation恥lodel
3-1 The Out! ine of the lVlodel 
As rn巴nLIonedbefor巴， this activities alocation rnodeJ is forrnulated as th巴
n-person non-cooperative games where each activity plays the part OL a pJayer. 
Herea仕巴r，in order to correspond ¥0. the terms used in the theory of the garnes， 
W巴 wilcal an activity a player and a potential valu巴 apayoffj respectively. 
Each player gets on巴 gridat eac;h play. Th巴 proc巴Sof getting a grid is 
as fo11oW8: each player decides h1S strategy of the play， everγ 。playerpresents 
bis strategy simultaneously， confl.icts of strategies are managed if there are any， 
and the grid given to each player is determined. Here， the strat巴gyof a. player 
means th巴 griclhe selected as the most advantageous one out of al the grids in 
the play. Each player decides his stl'ategy at every play according to the fo1ow-
ing process・ Ata certain play hc has as many strat巴giesas remaining grids， which 
Calculation of Evaluation VaJues 
Fig. 1 Flowchart of Framing an Alocation Plan 
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have their own payoff.~ namely potential values. But those valu巴swiU be 1n-
fluenced by other players' strategies. Because the values、Nilbe changed owing 
to th巴interactiveefects of the grids other players will get at that play. Therefore， 
hc forecasts other playcrs' strategies stochastically， that is to say， he assumes other 
players wil take mixed strategies， and he chooses the strategy which brings the 
maximum expect巴dpayoff. 
After one play finishes and every player gets his grid， the potential values 
of the grids adjoining those grids change， owing to their interactive efecls. Th巴
above・mentionedplay shall be done over again until the demand of al activities 
is satisfied， and eventualy an allocation plan vl'il b巴 made. Naturally the dか
mand vari巴sfrom activity to activity， sothe activities which satisfy their demand 
drop out of the game. 
Some alternatives based on policies can be easily made by means o[ changing 
the initial Dotential values. Fi2". 1 shows the above-mentioned flcw of alocation J"~ ..~ ，...， _. . -"._" . '0' 
planning 
3-2 Notation and Definition 
a) Playcrs (Activities) 
The players of this game， namely， activitics are denoted by 1， 2， ・・，k， "'，
L， ・，n， and the set of the players is denoted by N. 
λ1={1，2，…， k，…， l，…， n} ???
b) Strategies (Grids) 
As mentioned at 3-1， the set of the strategies is equivalent to the set 01' grids 
the activities can get at each play. So every player has the same set of ~ trategies 
and this臼 tM is expresed by the grid's numb巴r1， 2， "'， i，…，) …， rn， as
A1 = {l， 2， ・.'， 1.，・'，)， …， m} (2) 
c) Plays 
In this game a play is done over again until the demand of al activities is 
~atisfied . The play number and the set of plays are denoted by 1， 2， ・，h，••• 
and H， respectively. 
H =， {l， 2， ・"，h， • ・・} (3) 
d) Potcntial values 
The potential value of activity k， grid i at I-th play is denoted byバ(i). 
e) Int巴ractiv巴effectsvalues and co巴伍Cl巴ntsof interactive efects 
The interactive efi巴ctvalue is defin巴das the change of the potential value. 
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The interactiv巴巴佐ctvalue that activity 1 at grid j affects activity k at grid i is 
given by Eq. (4). This equation is based on the gravity mod巴1，and that value is 
assumed to be inversely proportional to the square of the distance between two 
grids. The numerator of Eq. (4)， fk'， denotes the coefficient of the interactive 
effect， which represents the effect value at a unit distance. The denominator 
r(人j)represents the dista町 ebetween grid i and gridj・
ail(i，j) =p'f{r(i，j)F (4) 
f) D巴mandfo1' space 
The number of grids activity k d巴mandsis denoted by dk • 
3-3 Th巴 Procedureof the Simulation 
The procedure of the simulation of the activities allocation wil be eXplained 
in accordanc巴withthe flowchart shown in Fig. 2. 
7) Acquisition of the Grid by ↑h巴Activity
Giving it the Greotest 'Weight 
8) Choice of Str口tegiesof ↑he PI口yers
who Couldn t Get 0 Grid 
Fig. 2 Procedure of Simulation 
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1) 1山 ialpolent凶 values
Th巴 potentialvalues which are obtained by means of t-he potential analysis 
are used for the first play as þ~ (i) _ 
2) Calculation of weights 
Here， weights mean r巴lativepotential values which sum up to a l.Init. Name-
ly， ¥h巴vveightof activity k and grid i at h-th play is giv巴nbv 
叫(i)= þ%(i) /~ バ (i) ・ (5)
th巴refore
21バ(i)= 1.0 (6) 
Thesc values can be considered as how th巴 activityattaches irnportance to 
the grid， and are us巴din the folowing two situatiollS. 
a) As the probability of the strategy wh(n a player predicts othe1' plav巴rs'stra te-
gles. 
b) When a conflict of strategies occurs， the player who weigbs that grid with 
the greatest can rec巴iveit. 
3) Calculation of expected payofis 
As stated beforr， inchoosing his strategy， each player prcdicts othe1' players' 
st1'at巴giesstochasticaly， calculates th巴 exp仁ctedpayo釘 foreacb st1'at巴gy，and 
cbooses on巴 ofthem which brings the greate，'t cxpectecl payoff. That is tι say， 
巴achplayer calculates expected payo'fI.~ on thc assumpt:ion that othe1' players 
would takc mixed strategies and the above-mentioned weights are regarded as b 
the probability dist1'ibution of the mixecl st1'at巴gies.As wiJl be mentioned in 
detaiJ at 7)， iftherで isa conflict of strategies， the player giving that grid the greatest 
weight a1110ng al players can receive it. Th巴1'efore，th巴 expectedpayof of player 
k and gricl i at h th play can be calculated辻sfo ll O\~， s : 
eZ(i) = þ%(i)+~ ~ wf，(j) akl (i ， j ) __ ~ 叫(i)バ(i) (7) 
同二kj平 F IEL 
wherc 
L = {L I叫(i)<叫(i)} (8) 
4) Choice of strategy 
T11巴 strat巴gyGf pla下erk at h-th play is that which brings the greate~t eZ(i) 
1n Eq. (7) 
5) .Judgement of whfth巴l'the陀 isany confljct of strategies 
A con丘ictof stratcgies means that two or morc players take the same strate司
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gies. lf ther巴isa conflict， go to: 6)， and if nむし goto 9). 
6) .Judgement of a condition of a col1f1ist 
When there isa conflict， how many activities participate in it at how many 
grids should be search巴d.
7) Acquisition of the grid by the activity giving it the greatest weight 
If two or more players conflict for a grid， the player who gives it the greatest 
weight among them can receive it. The reason is that the player who gives ita 
sma1er weight has relatively more grids with high potential values. 
8) Choice of strategy of the player who couldn't get a grid 
The players who couldri't get giids ，it 7) have to change thelr strategies. 
They once more calculate the expected' payofs' considering th巴 interactiveefects 
of the grids alocated at 7) and choose their strategies， then go back to 5). 
9) Acquisition of grids for al activities 
When there isno more conflict， a1grids to which al activities are alocated 
at that play are determined. 
10) Cha時 eof potential values 
When a1 alocat巴dgrids at that_ play are. determined， a1 potential values 
around them change owing 'to' thei: iIIfuaetive e汀ects: 'These changed values 
shal be used at the next play. Therefore， the potential value of activity k and 
grid i at h+トthplay is， 
バ+l(i)=バ(i)ート2J.2J akl(i，j) ok(j) (9) 
where 
ー ? 。
? ???、 。 when activity l was allocated to gridj at h-th play 
otherwise 
1) .Judgement of whether demand is satisfied 
The activity whose demand is satisfied with the grids ithas received drops 
out of the game. If al activities satisfy their demand， go to 12); otherwise， go 
back to 2) and begin the next play. 
12) Output of conseqlence of alloca1ion 
When al activitics satisfy ihei1' dema吋 andthe allocation fin凶 es，the map 
and the evaluation val11es are put out. 
4. A' Case Study 
4-1 Premises of the Examplc 
As a case study， the model proposed in this paper isapplied to the coastal 
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Table 2 Activities in Coastal Zonc 
Recreational Type Activities 
Parks and Green Zones 
Bathing Beach 
1へ'atersfor Plcasure Boats 
Marina 
lndustrial Type Activities 
lndustrial Land 
Port and Harbours 
Land for Disposal of vVaste Mattel' 
Sewage Disposal Plants 
Fishery Type Activities 
vVaters for Coastal Fishery 
Fish Farms 











waters in the Osaka Bay area. Some premises of this example are as follows. 
(1) Concerned area 
The concerned area is the coastal waters at a depth of les than about 20 m. 
The a1'ea is divided into small g1'ids (about 1 km2)， and the numbe1' of them is 
about 600. 
(2) Activities 
The concerned activities a1'e the following fou1' activities: recreational type 
activity， industrial type activity， fishery type activity and 1'esidential type activity. 
Each activity consists of some groups as shown in Table 2 
(3) Demand forecasting 
Demand of each activity for space in the concerned area is estimated from 
the demand fo1' land area behind Osaka Bay in the fifteen years f1'om 1986 to 
2000.5) Consequently， the numbet Qf grids of demand is 24 grids fo1' recrea-
tional type activity， 40 grids for industrial type activity， 32 g1'ids for fishe1'Y type 
activity and 30 grids for residential type activity， 1'espectively. 
(4) Potential analysis 
The consequences of the potential analysis5) for each activity are shown in 
Figs. 3， 4， 5 and 6. 
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Tablc 3 Cocfficicnts of Interactivc Effccts 
三¥¥LIRecze…l lI山 rー idleri |…ωType Activity I Type Activity I Type Activity I Type Activity 
Recreational 0.3 -0.4 0.0 0.0 Type Activity 
lndustrial 一0.2 0.4 -0.2 -0.2 Type Activity 
FIsherAy c 
Type Activity -0.1 0.4 0.2 -0.2 
Residential 0.2 -0.4 0，0 0.2 Type Activity 
(β5) Coe伍C悶
The c∞oe伍Cl止巴n凶ltof inter、a配ctiv刊eef釘r巴目ct臼s，fkμぺIヘ， namely the change 0ぱfpot匂enti悶凶a叫l 
values t出ha剖tactivity l af釘fectsactivity k at a unit distance iおsdefined as shown in  
Table 3. 
4-2 Consequences of Simulation and Discussion 
On the basis of the above premises activities were allocated by th巴propos巴d
model. Thc map of consequence is shown in Fig. 7. 1n Fig. 7， the grids on 
LAND 
Fig. 7 An Allocatiol1 Plan 
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Evaluation Values of the Allocation Plan 
¥ ¥ LIMeatIonal lhd山
Type Activity 1 Type Activity 1 Type Activity 1 Type Activity 
PSUM (k) 206.5 358.5 312.3 251.0 
PSUM 1128.3 
Table 4 
which 1， 2， 3 and 4 are printed express those to which recreational type activity， 
industrial type activity， fishery type activity and residential type activity were 
allocat巴drespectively. The grids on which 0 is printed express thos巴 towhich 
no activity was allocated. 1n Table 4， PSUM(k) r巴presentsthe sum total of 
potential values activity k obtained after the allocation finishes， and PSUM re-
pr田entsthe sum total of PSUM(k) in regard to k. 
Next， as an alternative which accepts the intention of the supply side， the 
activities were allocated on the condition that som巴 usedistricts are assigned. 
Fig. 8 shows the map of the consequence. 1n this figure， the top-left area from 
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Evaluation Values under Use Districts 
~I恥creational lIndustrial lmshml lhidentia 
Type Activity I Type Activity I Type Activity I Type Activity 
PSUM (k) 209.5 356.5 313.1 250.6 
PSUM 1130.3 
TabJe 5 
activity cannot b巴allocatedthere. The evaluation values are shown in Table 5. 
When the evaluation values in Table 4 are compared with those in Table 5， 
the sum total of the potential values in Table 5， namely on the condition that 
a use district is assigned， isgreater than that in Table 4， namely without a use 
district. However， the sum total of the potential values of th巴 industrialtype 
activity in Table 5 issmaller than that in Table 4. So it is considered that in・
dustrial type activity would not be satisfied with this aSFignment of the use dis・
tnct. 
Finally， asthe sensitivity analysis of the interactive effects， activities were 
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Table 6 Evaluation Values in No Consideration 01 Intera:ctive Effects 
~よ--1…Type Activity I Type Activity I Type Activity I Type Activity 
PSUM (k) 191.0 318.0 288.0 238.0 
Psu:rvI 1035.0 
Fig. 9 and Table 6. As shown in this figur巴， every activity was allocated so scat-
t巴ringlythat there would be problems of efficiency and environment. Furth巴r，
the sum total of th巴potentialvalues is fairly sma11， sowe can just均 thesignificance 
of considering the interactive e町民tsin allocating activities. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
1n this paper， an activities allocation model in coastal waters is proposed 
considering th巴 interactiveeffects among activities. The results we obtained 
through this research may be summarized as follows: 
(1) By means of the activities allocation model considering both the positive 
and negative interactive effects， which have hardly been considered so far， eficient 
allocation plans can be made. Since this model is aided with a computer， itcan 
b巴fitfor an enlargement of the concerned area and an increase of the activiti巴s.
(2) If time ~erial data of demand ar巴 putin， itmay be possib¥e to make 
a dynamic allocation model. 
(3) It is considered that simulation models are more efficient than programming 
models to adopt the actual complicated conditions into the models. 
Finally， the following points are left as future problems: 
(1) It occurs in this model that the potential value of the grid an activity hacl 
obtained is reduced on account of other activities: adjacently allocatecl. There-
fore， the allocation plan by this model is not always the most efficient one. 
(2) In using this model， itis necessary to evaluate the interactive effects pre伺
cisely. However， the study of this field has hardly be巴ndone thus far， so further 
study is necessary. 
(3) Since demand of space varies from activity 10 activity， this rnoclel adopts 
the rule that an activity which satisfies its demand drops out of the game. Many 
other rules， such as the number of grids allocated in a play vari巴saccording to 
the activity， should b巴examined.
Here， th巴 authorswish to thank Mr. Hideki Mori (Yokohama City Goverrト
ment， form巴r.undergraduate stud巴川 ofKyoto Uぬiv.)for his assistancc with com 
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